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Does internal debt matter?  Japan’s yen-denominated 
public debt now totals 140% of GDP, and this number 
continues to rise rapidly.  What constraints will this 
growing debt finally encounter?  I argue that finance can 
postpone but not eliminate payments owed by the 
government to the private sector.  The combination of 
continuing Keynsian budget deficits, bleeding banks, over-
leveraged municipalities and massive pension liabilities 
will ultimately bring into question the credibility of the 
government’s many promises.  The result could be a 
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Introduction 
During the 1980s and 1990s many countries defaulted on their external debt, i.e. 
amounts owed to lenders outside the country and denominated in dollars or other strong 
currency accepted in international capital markets.  Defaults on internal debt, however, 
i.e. amounts owed to lenders inside the country and denominated in local currency, were 
quite rare. 
Economists typically minimize concerns about internal debt because it appears to 
involve simply allocation:  taken as a whole, a country owes the internal debt to itself, so 
that paying it or not paying it does not enrich or impoverish the real economy, but simply 
reallocates wealth within the country.  This is in sharp contrast to external debt, whose 
payment involves transferring real resources to foreigners. 
Furthermore, it seems that local debt should never default because the government 
can always issue more local currency to meet debt service requirements.  Of course, this 
generally leads to inflation.  Economically, inflation is a partial default in the sense that 
lenders do not receive the same real value that was lent, but it is not a legal default – the 
debt is paid, even if in degraded currency.  Rating agencies, for example, do not consider 




Japan presents a vivid test of whether internal debt matters.  Japan is a wealthy, 
industrialized country with a massive current account surplus and net financial claims on 
the rest of the world.  Its capacity to pay claims of outsiders is not in doubt.  It is 
externally wealthy.  But Japan does have a massive internal sovereign debt. 
Japan has traditionally kept a balanced budget.  Some fiscal deficits arose in the 
1970s due to oil price increases and the economic slowdown, but they were aggressively 
reduced as prosperity returned in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, however, internal debt and 
deficits have ballooned dramatically, both as a result of and in response to a seemingly 
interminable Japanese recession.  As recently as 1997 the government made a 
commitment to hold debt to 60% of GDP.  But in 2001 it reached 140% of GDP and is 
projected to hit 148% by the end of 2002.1  So should we, or the Japanese, be worried? 
The bond rating agencies are clearly worried, and have recently lowered their 
ratings on Japan’s yen-denominated government bonds to A- (Standard & Poors) and A2 
(Moodys), a level comparable to the internal debt ratings of Greece, Israel, Cyprus and 
Latvia.  The Japanese have complained bitterly that this is irrational and unjust. 
Suppose Japan does not alter its present course and continues to display low 
growth, high budget deficits, and growing internal debt relative to GDP.  Can this 
continue to go on indefinitely, or would it finally encounter limits, problems and 
constraints?  Answering that question is the purpose of this paper. 
                                                 




Why internal debt might matter 
High public debt must finally encounter at least one of two ultimate constraints:  
market capacity and absorption of tax revenues by interest.  Let us consider each in turn. 
Market capacity 
When a government runs budgetary deficits, it must sell bonds to someone.  The 
candidates are (a) local institutional lenders such as banks and insurance companies; (b) 
the central bank; or (c) foreign lenders.  I will consider each in turn. 
(a)  Local institutions have a finite capacity to buy bonds, based ultimately on the 
national savings rate.  If the government forces banks and insurance companies to hold 
too many government bonds, this will eventually crowd out private sector borrowers.  
The price the government eventually pays for this action is reduced private sector lending 
and economic activity. 
(b)  The central bank can finance bond purchases by selling foreign reserves, 
though not for long.  Alternatively, it can pay for them almost indefinitely by creating 
currency and deposit claims in the government’s deposit account, expanding its balance 
sheet.  As the government spends this money on its deficits, the currency and deposit 
claims on the central bank are diffused through the private banks, where they count as 
reserves (high-powered money).  Holding additional reserves enables the banks to expand 
their own balance sheets, so that the money supply usually increases and prices usually 
rise. 
In this sense, selling bonds to the central bank generally leads to inflation.  




from those who hold money and fixed claims on money.  The inflation tax is politically 
easier than direct taxation, but it can lead to political unrest.  Efforts to protect the 
populace from inflation through indexing typically only accelerate the inflation, since 
they are efforts to protect at least some people from the tax while still collecting it, 
leading to an ever-higher “tax rate”.  Inflation, and especially hyper- inflation, tend to 
slow economic growth in part because of the uncertainties they create. 
(c)  In most developing countries the capacity of local lenders is limited because 
of low local savings.  Furthermore, most developing countries also run current account 
deficits, and sovereign foreign borrowing conveniently finances both the fiscal and the 
current account deficits.  But foreign borrowing reaches certain natural limits rather 
quickly, and with severe consequences, as Argentina recently found.  When the external 
market capacity limits are breached the country is forced to lower its imports to resolve 
the current account and fall back on (a) or (b) to finance the fiscal deficit. 
In the 1980s, when Mexico and Brazil lost access to foreign lenders because of 
their default on previous bank loans, they took opposite paths.  Mexico took option (a):  it 
nationalized the banks, pre-empting the national savings and using them to buy 
government bonds; the price of this was a gutting of the banking system’s capacity to 
support the private sector and resultant economic depression.  Brazil took option (b);  it 
left the banks intact and moved toward hyper- inflation, but this also depressed economic 
performance.  These two cases illustrate what happens when internal debt presses against 
market capacity to absorb it. 
In summary, foreign lenders are an attractive source of public funding, but their 




financial institutions are more docile but are also limited in capacity by the magnitude of 
local savings and the competing needs of the private sector.  The central bank is the 
government’s lender of last resort, which is why inflation is so endemic in developing 
countries.  Only industrial countries, with good fiscal controls and strong local bond 
markets, have been able to tame it. 
 
Tax revenues and interest 
The other ultimate constraint on the growth of internal debt occurs when interest 
expense begins to consume too much of tax revenues.  When this occurs, the deficit is 
pushed higher by the rising interest expense and debt begins to grow exponentially.  
Following is a simple model to show this: 
Let S = the structural fiscal deficit per unit time, let B = the total of government 
bonds outstanding, and let r = the rate of interest on this debt.  Then  
     Rate of total deficit  =  Rate of increase in bonds outstanding 
S + rB  =  dB/dt 
This says that B not only grows, it grows at a growing rate, proportionate to its size.  The 
solution to this equation is: 
B  =  S(ert-1)/r + B0ert  [Exponential model] 
where B0 is the initial (t=0) value of B.  Since ert » 1+rt for small rt, the first term is 




debt, and the second term becomes B0+B0rt, representing the capitalization of interest.  
Taking both together, we get a linear approximation: 
B  =  B0 + (S+rB0)t [Linear model] 
This approximate version can be applied recursively in a discrete time setting (B1 as a 
function of B0, B2 as a function of B1, etc.), and it will capture reasonably accurately the 
exponential nature of the growth, especially with low values of r. 
A perception that debt and deficits are growing exponentially may create strong 
pressures for tax increases to stop out-of-control deficit growth.  Selling bonds is, in 
effect, a postponement of tax increases, but nothing of importance can be credibly 
postponed forever.  Governments can resolve fiscal deficits by raising current taxes or by 
selling bonds, but selling bonds is a kind of promise to raise future taxes.  Sooner or later 
the future becomes the present and taxes must be raised just to pay interest on the 
ballooning debt. 
It is not easy to say at what point governments begin to perceive this as a 
problem.  In the United States federal debt and deficits became a political issue in the 
1980s.  The federal deficit had swollen to the $200-250 billion range, federal debt had 
grown to more than 40% of GDP and interest expenses had begun to exceed 20% of tax 
revenues.  All of this triggered considerable alarm that debt and deficits were starting to 
gallop out of control and gave rise to maverick political candidates (e.g. Ross Perot) who 
used uncontrolled deficits as a campaign issue.  Not until the 1990s did the astonishing 





This example makes the further point that strong economic performance can bail 
out an internal debt problem, while prolonged weak economic performance will tend to 
aggravate it. 
The facts about Japan 
Table I shows selected economic data on Japan, drawn from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), the Bank of Japan’s Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly 
(BOJ), and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
They show a pattern of government revenues falling over 1998-2000 at 4.4% per year, 
while expenditures rise at 2.2% per year, resulting in an escalating pattern of debt and 
deficit.  How close is Japan to the constraints described above? 
Market Capacity 
(a)  Up to now the Japanese government has had little problem selling its bonds to 
domestic banks, insurance companies and off-budget government agencies such as the 
Trust Fund Bureau which appear to hold about a third of the government’s debt.  Such 
institutions seem to buy them regardless of interest rate as a matter of national duty.  
Furthermore, the institutions seem far from having exhausted their capacity to buy more 
bonds.  For example, at year-end 2001 government bonds represented just 8.9% of total 
bank assets and 9.1% of life insurance company assets according to BOJ data. 
Furthermore, both the banking industry and the life insurance industry are so 
badly crippled with losses on previous corporate loans that both have been reducing 
rather than increasing their corporate loans outstanding during the 1990s, a major reason 




institutions have become intensely risk-averse, and may prefer government bonds to more 
private sector loans. 
According to IFS, loans to the private sector by Japan’s deposit money banks, 
after stagnating from 1992 to 1997, declined slowly from ¥583T [T=trillion] in 1998 to 
¥539T in 2001.  Claims on government, however, rose from ¥44T in 1998 to ¥99T in 
2001.  So there has been a significant replacement of private sector lending with 
government bonds in recent years, though it may not be appropriate in current conditions 
to describe this as “crowding out”. 
(b)  The central bank presents a slightly different story.  According to the BOJ’s 
published accounts, its holdings of government securities were ¥86T in March 2002, up 
only slightly from ¥82T in March 2000.  On the other hand, its total assets grew 
considerably, from ¥106T to ¥138T, and it may be that part or all of this growth was in 
support of the government in ways other than direct purchase of bonds. 
On the liability side of the BOJ’s balance sheet, the sum of banknotes outstanding 
and non-governmental deposits (“high-powered money”) grew from ¥75T to ¥97T in the 
same two years, so under conventional monetary economics the money supply should 
have expanded, leading to inflation.  But the peculiar situation of Japan’s financial 
system does not translate growth of the BOJ balance sheet into immediate inflation.  The 
money supply M1 has indeed been rising at 8-10% per year since 1998, yet M2 has risen 
much more slowly and there has been no inflation, indeed there has been a slight 
deflation. 
(c)  Foreigners hold about 6% of Japan’s sovereign bonds, and the great majority 




political courtesy.  The interest rate on Japanese bonds, currently about 1.4%, is simply 
too low to attract private sector investors. 
If bond rates were to rise materially, however, Japan’s sovereign debt could easily 
become attractive to foreign investors.  The potential global market is huge and has 
scarcely been tapped.  Tapping it would require higher real rates, i.e. both higher nominal 
rates and a conviction that the currency would remain strong, with low inflation.  But in 
terms of sheer capacity it would definitely be available at a price. 
In summary, it does not appear that market capacity is a binding constraint for 
Japan in the foreseeable future.  On the other hand, the government has made much of a 
commitment to limit annual issues of bonds to ¥30T.  Framing the voluntary constraint in 
this way does suggest some concern that the market not burdened with too many new 
bonds.  Note in Table I that this commitment will be difficult to keep in 2002, given the 
projected decline in revenues. 
Tax revenue and interest 
As to the other potential constraint, interest expense in 2001 is 32% of 
government revenues, which seems much closer to the point at which pressure to increase 
taxes must emerge.  Indeed, Hiromitsu Ishi, chairman of Japan’s tax commission, 
recently warned publicly that the tax cuts implemented between 1988 and 2000 were 
excessive and had to be reversed or Japan could be “bankrupt in 10 years”. 2 
The 32% figure is actually down from 42% in 2000.  Even though debt has 
grown, the average effective interest rate paid on total outstanding debt fell from 3.3% in 
                                                 




2000 to 2.4% in 2001.  This number will continue to fall toward the current rate on new 
government bonds as old bonds reach maturity, assuming the rate on new debt remains 
low. 
We can calibrate the debt growth model offered above to Japanese data.  The 
results are highly sensitive to the assumed value of S, the structural deficit.  Table I 
shows the officially stated budget deficit, which the government is attempting to cap at 
¥30T, and which matches the amount of bond issuance.  However, government debt has 
been growing each year by more than the amount of the deficit. 
As shown in Table I, the “true” deficit implied by the growth in debt is higher 
than the reported deficit.  Subtracting interest payments from the implied deficit and 
averaging over 1999-2001, we can estimate the remaining structural deficit at about ¥26T 
per year. 
Setting S=26 and B0=705, the growth of debt and interest under various interest 
rate scenarios is set forth in Table II.  If interest rates are about 2% for 10 years, the debt 
grows to about ¥1,100T.  At 5% interest it rises to ¥1,500T, i.e. more than doubles.  If 
GDP fails to grow during that period, the debt would rise from 140% of GDP to nearly 
300% of GDP. 
The more politically sensitive number, however, is the amount of interest 
compared to tax revenues.  Today, tax revenues are about ¥50T.  If the interest rate paid 
on government debt remained about 2%, the interest bill would grow from about ¥17T 




The greatest risk, in my view, is a continued growth of debt which does not seem 
problematic because interest rates are low, followed by a rise in interest rates.  If, for 
example, interest rates rose gradually to 5% over the 10 year period, accumulated debt 
might grow to ¥1,300T, but the annual interest bill on this would become ¥65T which 
would now exceed all the tax revenues. 
About 44% of government debt has a maturity of 10 years or longer,3 so Japan 
seems to have a cushion built into the system.  It would take some years for a higher bond 
rate to work itself fully into the fiscal deficit.  Understanding this cushion helps us to see 
why Japanese officials seem so complacent on this issue.  But it also shows that this 
could be a trap. 
What will finally happen? 
Japan’s very complacency about internal debt, its sense that it is cushioned 
against the obvious problems, probably means that debt will continue to increase for 
some years to come.  However, nothing can keep growing disproportionately forever.  
Sooner or later, the debt must be dealt with, and the longer it has built up the more 
painful the adjustment is likely to be.  In particula r, several large fiscal burdens lie in the 
road ahead, any of which could someday trigger alarm over its impact on public debt. 
The most immediate problem is the banking system.  The official quantification 
of non-performing loans stands at ¥37T, but most academic estimates are in the ¥70-80T 
range.  Much larger figures are reached when the “gray zone” of loans to seriously 
troubled borrowers is added to the actual non-performing loans.  Goldman Sachs puts the 
                                                 




debts of all bankrupt or potentially bankrupt companies at ¥170T, 4 The Economist uses 
¥150T5 and the IMF in August 2001 put this figure at ¥111T. 6  Bank losses on NPLs 
average about 30% in the U.S., but are likely to be much higher in Japan given the depth 
of its problems, in particular the destruction of collateral values.  If we assign a 50% loss 
rate against the IMF’s estimate of loans to bankrupt and potentially bankrupt companies, 
we get an estimated loss of ¥55T, i.e. equivalent to two years’ of structural deficits. 
A less-discussed problem is the shaky financial condition of regional and local 
governments.  The LDP can be understood as an alliance of regional politicians, many in 
rural areas, able to deliver votes so long as Tokyo continues to subsidize and conceal 
local problems.  This, plus the Japanese voting system which gives rural citizens two to 
four times the Diet representation of urban Japanese, helps to explain the LDP’s hitherto 
unchallenged hold on power. 
Many municipalities are seriously overextended, but the aggregate problem is 
difficult to quantify.  A independent survey two years ago put Tokyo’s debt at ¥20T, 
twice the previously-admitted total.7  This suggests that the aggregate of regional and 
local debts must be several hundred trillion yen.  One or more municipal bankruptcies 
would put immediate pressure on the central government for a bailout and could trigger 
major anxiety about debt and deficits. 
The largest internal off-budget claim is the pension system.  Because Japan has 
virtually no immigration, the age balance of its population is the most unfavorable in the 
                                                 
4 The Economist, April 18, 2002, p.1 of Japan survey. 
5 The Economist, June 22, 2002, p.72. 
6 IMF, Japan 2001 Article IV Consultation, August 2001. 




industrial world.  Like all major countries, Japan has a pay-as-you-go social security 
system which faces massive claims in the next 30 years, but Japan has a more severe 
demographic problem than any other industrial country.  While I do not have a 
quantification of the amount needed to honor all pension promises under various 
scenarios, many analysts seem to believe it is so large that the promises somehow will 
have to be adjusted.  This by itself implies some sort of default. 
If little changes within the next 10 years the fraction of tax revenues consumed by 
interest will enter a critical zone (i.e. 50-75%).  The government will then have to choose 
whether to raise taxes materially, to default on pension promises or debt, or to inflate the 
currency.  Since raising taxes is so contentious and default is so humiliating, the softer 
option of printing money will inevitably enter the debate. 
The possibility of issuing currency to resolve pressure on tax revenues will trigger 
turbulence and periodic panic in the market for both government bonds and foreign 
exchange.  While the central bank can control short-term interest rates, long-term rates 
are set by the marginal buyer (or the absence of a marginal buyer) in the secondary 
market, over which the government has little control. 
In January 1999, for example, the Trust Fund Bureau announced that it no longer 
had funds to buy government bonds, Moody’s downgraded government bonds from Aaa 
to Aa1, and within six weeks secondary market yields doubled from 1.2% to 2.4%.8  The 
panic was brief, but the impact on long-term interest rates was slow to reverse.  This type 
of incident is likely to be repeated in the coming years. 
                                                 




If the government were very strong, clear and decisive, its best course at some 
point in the future could well be a one-shot massive issuance of yen to repay or buy back 
perhaps half to three-quarters of the government bonds outstanding, followed by a 
commitment to issue no more.  Yet even this kind of resolution, which is taken for 
granted as feasible by most economists, needs to be examined more closely. 
For example, if the BOJ were to make a tender offer for ¥500T of outstanding 
bonds and finance the purchase with new central bank liabilities, the new liabilities would 
dwarf the current ¥97T of reserve money.  BOJ’s balance sheet would explode and the 
quantity of high-powered money would increase nearly six-fold.  Such a program is too 
large, in other words, for conventional monetary tools to manage. 
The ¥500T would represent about 17% of M1, which stands at about ¥3000T.  To 
be feasible, the repayment should be made a direct increment to M1.  This suggests that 
the government would have to issue a new currency in exchange for all existing yen and 
most existing government bonds.  The consequence of this idealized program would be a 
one-shot reduction in wealth and real living standards by the amount of the inflation 
(perhaps 17%, although this is by no means certain), and in this manner the Japanese 
people would finally pay in real wealth for the excessive government spending of the 
past. 
It is almost inconceivable, however, that the government would be able to take 
such a massive step quickly and decisively.  Given its long history of vacillation and 
indecision, and the need for consensus in Japanese decision-making, the more likely 
scenario is increasing anxiety, debate, tentative steps and reversals.  This unfortunate 




The worst effects of inflation are caused by its uncertainty. 9  Persistent 
uncertainty about policy in the face of severe fiscal pressures and market panic could 
have very negative consequences, including sharply increased long-term interest rates 
and a collapse in the value of the yen.  This would put substantial stress on the world 
trading system as well as on the government in power.  Perhaps this would be the set of 
events that finally cause the LDP to break up and new opposition parties to emerge. 
Conclusion 
Internal debt does matter.  When it is readily available, as in Japan, it can be used 
to postpone for many years the consequences of the government spending more than it 
takes in.  But a high and rising ratio of interest expenses to GDP will finally create an 
unsustainable situation.  At some point, market volatility will drive up interest rates and 
accelerate the problem.  The only possible outcomes are tax increases, default or issuance 
of currency.  The latter will prove to be the least painful of these, and should therefore be 
expected.  Finance reallocates burdens in time, but does not make them go away.  Sooner 
or later, the Japanese government will have to deal with the fact that it does not have 
enough resources to meet all the claims upon it. 
                                                 





 Table I:  Selected Data on Japan (¥ billion)   
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Source Annual 
Growth 
GDP (Nominal) 516,191 512,435 513,822 504,181   EIU -0.8% 
               
Govt Revenues 62,111 50,810 52,377 54,334 46,800 EIU / FT -4.4% 
Govt Expenditures 77,669 81,860 84,987 82,652 81,230 EIU 2.1% 
Deficit -15,558 -31,050 -32,610 -28,318 -34,430 EIU  
               
Govt Debt outstanding  
(ex Soc. Sec.) 
437,555 492,970 538,386 582,456   BOJ 10.0% 
 held by banks 25,292 26,689 30,710 38,697   BOJ  
 held by life insurance cos 24,699 27,599 27,161 31,187   BOJ  
 implicit deficit   -55,415 -45,416 -44,070      
               
Govt Debt outstanding (incl. 
Soc. Sec.) 568,842 615,434 668,996 705,853   7.5% 
   as fraction of GDP 110.2% 120.1% 130.2% 140.0% 148.0% EIU  
   implicit deficit   -46,592 -53,562 -36,857    
               
Debt service 17,263 19,832 21,965 17,171 16,671 EIU -0.2% 
   as fraction of Revenues 28% 39% 42% 32%      





  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Source Annual 
Growth 
BOJ claims on 
government 37,929 50,063 44,422 71,855  IFS  
Currency held outside 
banks 54,310 59,404 61,947 66,676  IFS 
7.1% 
Reserve money 64,336 89,621 73,273 85,957  IFS 10.1% 
        
Growth of BOJ claims on 
government 17.1% 32.0% -11.3% 61.8%   
 
Growth of currency 3.7% 9.4% 4.3% 7.6%    
Growth of reserve money 3.6% 39.3% -18.2% 17.3%    
Change in Wholesale 
Price Index -1.6% -1.5% 0.1% -0.8%  IFS  
Change in Consumer 
Price Index 0.7% -0.3% -0.7% -0.7%  IFS  
        
Percent change in M1 8.1 10.5 8.2 8.5 24.4 BOJ  
Percent change in M2 4.0 3.6 2.1 2.8 3.8 BOJ  
Percent change in 






  Table II:  A Model of Japan's Debt and Deficits   
       
  Initial value of internal debt B0 = 705   
  Annual fiscal deficit S = 26   
  Interest rate on debt r = 2.0%   
        
       Evolution of Debt (B)  Interest              Debt after 10 Years   
Year (t) 
Recursive 
Linear Exponential  Rate 
Recursive 
Linear Exponential Interest 
0 705 705      
1 745 746  1.0% 1,036 1,053 11 
2 785 787  2.0% 1,106 1,149 23 
3 825 829  3.0% 1,177 1,255 38 
4 865 872  4.0% 1,247 1,371 55 
5 906 916  5.0% 1,318 1,500 75 
6 946 961  6.0% 1,388 1,641 98 
7 986 1,006  7.0% 1,459 1,796 126 
8 1,026 1,053  8.0% 1,529 1,967 157 
9 1,066 1,100      
10 1,106 1,149      
 
